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Is there a dierence between recollecting episodes from the past and recalling autobiographically?
Both in the philosophical and psychological literature, it does not seem that there is a consensus on
whether autobiographical memories should be considered as a metaphysically equivalent concept to
episodic memories or a dierent category of memory entirely. In this article, I give reasons to believe that
autobiographical memories do not relate to the recollection of past episodes since they do not have an as-
sociated subjective experience and the consequential experience of mental time travel. Autobiographical
memories, I argue, are presented as a narrative that is constructed propositionally, thus diering substan-
tially from episodic memory in its subjective property, the reference to the self, and the content in which
each one is grounded. To do so, first I use data from the psychological literature on amnesic patients as
evidence for both the dierence in phenomenology and content. And second, I use insights from recent
philosophical literature on memory and the self, to defend that what is referred here as “autobiographical
memory” is indeed a dierent kind of memory that diers substantially from episodic memory and slightly
from semantic memory.1
1 Introduction
Through remembering, we can re-experience our past and this is particularly impor-
tant for our own identity. But to what extent does the remembrance of past episodes
contribute to the internal narrative of our lives? Let us suppose that we are asked to deter-
mine whether we are generally happy in our lives. To do so, would we have to remember
all our happy past episodes, as opposed to the sad ones? Or, would our “happiness eval-
uation” result from a preconceived notion of “general happiness” available to us, based
on the narrative of our lives? This question can be formulated dierently to t the philo-
sophical debate: When we recall the narrative of our lives, do we use episodic informa-
tion, semantic information, or both? What this problem seems to refer to is the doubt in
whether we can dierentiate clearly between episodic and autobiographical memories.
Here, I defend the idea that remembering a life narrative, or autobiographical recalling,
does not need to be represented through the remembrance of past episodes but can be a
representation based on semantic information available to the individual. Furthermore, I
intend to show that episodic and autobiographical memories can be distinguished based
on their phenomenology. Although episodic remembering is an experience of mental
1I would like to thank César Schirmer dos Santos for his comments on previous versions of this paper, as well as Eduardo Vicentini
de Medeiros for some insightful discussions about the topic.
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time travel, with the necessary awareness that the episode belongs to the subject’s per-
sonal past (autonoesis), both mental time travel and autonoesis are not present in auto-
biographical memory. This claim is based on psychological research focused on the am-
nesic patient K.C. The studies of K.C.’s case suggest that although he cannot remember
past episodes and create new ones, he can, to some extent, present semantic knowledge
about his autobiography. This was primarily used by Tulving to identify the properties of
the subjective experience of remembering.2 However, Tulving le aside any conclusions
about how this autobiographical semantic information could be used to compose K.C’s
life narrative. What I propose is that the semantic autobiographical knowledge that K.C.
has is sucient to account for a chronologically ordered life narrative.
The distinction proposed here considers both the type of content that constitutes
each type of memory and the phenomenological nature of both memories. Concerning
the content of which type of memory, I defend, diering from most of the philosophical
literature, that autobiographical memory draws its content from semantic information.
Concerning their phenomenology, I argue that while episodicmemory has a distinct phe-
nomenology characterized by autonoetic consciousness, autobiographical memory, as is
expected fromsemantic information, is not related to autonoetic consciousness andmen-
tal time travel but canbemore easily associatedwithnoetic consciousness. To supportmy
thesis, I will show in section 2 the denition of autonoesis and its necessity for episodic
remembering. Then, in section 3, I will defend that autonoesis is not required for autobi-
ographical recalling and that, therefore, it cannot consist of an experience ofmental time
travel. And nally, in section 4, I will defend the view in which autobiographical memory
is a separate form of declarative memory, diering substantially from episodic memory
and slightly from semantic memory.
The main argument of this article can be exposed as follows:
(1) All episodic memory has an autonoetic property (shown by the philosophical
and psychological literature on memory).
(2) Some autobiographicalmemory does not have an autonoetic property (shown
by the studies of the amnesic patient K.C).
(3) If two entities are identical, then theymust present identical properties. (Prin-
ciple of indiscernibility of identicals).
(4) Episodicmemory and autobiographicalmemory dier in the autonoetic prop-
erty. (1,2)
(5) ∴ Episodic memory is dierent from autobiographical memory. (3,4)
2Tulving, E., “Memory and Consciousness.,” Canadian Psychology/Psychologie Canadienne 26, no. 1 (January 1985), 5-6.
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Let: episodic memory = E, autobiographical memory = A,
autonoetic property = T, any property = P.
(1) ∀(x)[E(x)→ T(x)]
(2) $(y)[A(y)∧ ∼ T(y)]
(3) ∀(x)∀(y)[x = y→ ∀P(P(x) ≡ P(y))]
(4) ∀(x)∀(y)[E(x) ∧ A(y))→ ∀(T)(T(x) ≡∼ T(y))] (1, 2)
(5) ∴ ∀(x)∀(y)[(E(x) ∧ A(y)) ∧ ∀T(T(x) ≡∼ T(y))→∼ (x = y)] (3, 4)
2 The Necessity of Autonoetic Consciousness for
Episodic Memory
The use of the terms “episodicmemory” and “autobiographical memory” can vary widely
within the philosophical and psychological debate. From their conceptual identica-
tion to their conceptual distinction, these terms have been used variably, and this can
be a problem. And that is because there is no consensus on whether we should use the
term “autobiographical” as meaning a mental representation of a narrative nature or an
episodic nature. If we intend to widen our understanding of human memory and how
it is related to a life narrative, solving this problem is of great importance. So, for the
sake of clarication, in this section, I will show the denitions of two main categories of
memory, episodic and semantic, and show that autonoetic consciousness is necessary for
episodic memory as viewed as an experience of mental time travel. In the next section, I
will deal with autobiographical memory, its characterization, and present reasons why it
is not related to autonoetic consciousness or mental time travel.
2.1 Some Definitions on Types of Memories and Their
Respective Consciousnesses
Episodic memory is dened as a present mental representation of past experiences with
perceptual and temporal information that is accompanied by a state of consciousness,
the so-called autonoetic consciousness or autonoesis.3 Episodic memory relates specically
to past episodes from the individual’s life, and its content is perceptual, meaning that it is
a re-experience of the given past episode. In this re-experience, the subject can relive
the episode with a signicant amount of sensorial (visual, olfactory, auditory, etc.) qual-
ity. To remember episodically is “to consciously re-experience past experiences”.4 On
3Tulving, "Memory and Consciousness.”, 3.
4Tulving, E., “Episodic Memory: FromMind to Brain”, Annual Review of Psychology 53, no. 1 (February 2002), 6.
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the other hand, semantic memory deals with propositional information related to gen-
eral knowledge of the world.5 Semantic memory is necessary for language use because
it deals with verbal symbols, their meanings, relations among them, and rules for their
manipulation.6
To put it more clearly, the dierence between episodic and semantic memory is
that the former is presented perceptually to the subject, and the latter is presented propo-
sitionally.7 In this sense, to remember episodically is to remember what it was like for
you to experience your last birthday party, for instance, and to recall semantically is to
recall knowledge learned in the past, such as, for example, “2+2=4” or that “Germany is lo-
cated within Europe”. You could, nonetheless, remember propositions about your birth-
day party like “I remembered it happened on the 4th of August” but this information is
not presented as an experience of reliving this episode. Likewise, you could remember
episodically the day that you learned that “2+2=4” but when you remember the proposi-
tional information, the experience of the episode does not come to mind.
Episodic memories are a present re-experience of the perceptual information of
an event, be it visual, olfactory, auditory, palatal, or tactile. But, along with the experi-
ence of perceptual contents, episodic memories are accompanied by a specic type of
consciousness, named autonoesis. Autonoesis is dened as the awareness of one’s expe-
riences in a subjective timeline, and being a necessary component of episodicmemory, it
assures that when the individual remembers episodically, he is aware of the remembered
episode’s existence in his past.8 On the phenomenal aspect of this kind of consciousness,
Tulving says that: “The awareness and its feeling-tone are intimately familiar to everynor-
mal humanbeing. One seldommistakes remembering for any other kind of experience—
perceiving, imagining, dreaming, daydreaming, or just thinking about things one knows
about the world.”.9 Thereby, autonoesis is important for episodic remembering because
(1) it is what allows the subject to be aware of the subjective time in which events hap-
pened,10 and (2) is what individuates episodic memory from other forms of memory. On
the other hand, semantic memory is related to noetic consciousness. Noetic consciousness
dictates that the subject is conscious of the knowledge he possesses and can cognitively
operate upon them, permitting thus its declaration utilizing symbolic knowledge. The
dierence between noetic and autonoetic consciousness is that in the former, the subject
has no awareness of the qualitative temporal character of the content.
It is also important to note that there is a dierence between knowing that an
episode is from the past and being aware that the episode is from your past. In the for-
mer, being past is an attributed property of the representation of the event. For instance,
in semantic memory, I can know that the proposition “Napoleon lost the battle of Wa-
terloo in 1815” is past, but only because I infer it from other propositions such as “I am
living in the year 2021” and “The year 1815 is past in relation to the year 2021”.11 Whereas
5Tulving, “Memory and Consciousness.”, 3.
6Tulving, “Memory and Consciousness.”, 3.
7Michaelian, K., "Mental Time Travel: Episodic Memory and Our Knowledge of the Personal Past", (MIT Press, 2016), 35.
8Tulving, “Memory and Consciousness.”, 3.
9Tulving, E., “What Is Episodic Memory?,” Current Directions in Psychological Science, no. 3 (1993), 68.
10Tulving, E., “Episodic Memory: FromMind to Brain.” Annual Review of Psychology, 53 (2002), 2.
11Klein, S.B., “Autonoesis and Belief in a Personal Past: An Evolutionary Theory of Episodic Memory Indices,” Review of Philosophy
and Psychology 5, no. 3 (2014), 437.
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in the latter, which is related to autonoetic consciousness, being past is a phenomenolog-
ically intrinsic property of the event that the subject represents. If you remember your
last birthday party, the pastness of the event is phenomenologically embedded in the rep-
resentation, so you have an experience ofwhat it is like to experience the episode as a part of
your past.
2.2 Episodic Memory as an Autonoetic Mental Time Travel
Experience
Thus we arrive at the idea of episodic memory as mental time travel. When an individ-
ual remembers episodically, she can place herself in a subjective timeline, in the case of
episodic memory, in the past, and can consciously re-experience the remembered event.
We call this capacity to project oneself at a specic point in this subjective timeline, mental
time travel (MTT).12 And it is through MTT that the individual can access the experien-
tial information that is stored in the episodic memory system. Tulving supports the idea
that the ability to mentally travel to the past is strictly related to the ability to imagine
or pre-experience possible future scenarios, i.e., the ability to mentally time travel to the
future.13 He inferred through the case of patient N.N., later identied as patient K.C.,14
that there must be a signicant correlation between memory decits and the inability to
imagine the future. He suggests that problems in one’s autonoetic capabilities may aect
both the awareness of the past, as well as the awareness of the future, insofar as K.C.’s
behavior indicates that he lives in a “permanent present” (more on that in section 3).
This brought to light another view about the relationship between memory and
imagination, which considers both as sharing the same fundamental mental capacity,
namely, one of MTT. In the current debate about the dierence between memory and
imagination, wehave both the continuist view,whichholds thatmemory and imagination
are brain processes of the same kind, and the discontinuist view which holds that mem-
ory and imagination are dierent types of neural processes. Based on the same beliefs
as Tulving, continuists separated MTT abilities according to their temporal orientation.
The one related to episodic memory has a past temporal orientation and is called past-
orientedmental time travel (PMTT). And the one related to imagined future scenarios has
a future temporal orientation and is called future-oriented mental time travel (FMTT).15
This distinction is quite important when we aim to dierentiate the temporal orientation
of memories and imagination. However, as I intend to discuss only concepts that are
included under the term “memory”, I will refer to MTT here as meaning past-oriented
mental time travel.
Thereby, as far as the distinction between autonoesis andmental time travel goes,
we could put it a little bit more explicitly by saying that autonoesis is the awareness of the
12Wheeler, Stuss, and Tulving, “Toward a Theory of Episodic Memory: The Frontal Lobes and Autonoetic Consciousness,” Psycho-
logical Bulletin 121, no. 3 (1997), 331.
13Tulving, “Memory and Consciousness.”, 5.
14This disambiguation can be seen in Tulving et al., “Priming of Semantic Autobiographical Knowledge: A Case Study of Retrograde
Amnesia,” Brain and Cognition 8, no. 1 (1988), 7.
15Perrin and Michaelian, “Memory as Mental Time Travel,” The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory (Routledge, 2019), 228.
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existence of oneself in a subjective timeline, and MTT is the action of mentally putting
oneself at some point of this timeline. As Tulving puts it: “Mental time travel allows one,
as an “owner” of episodicmemory (“self”), through themedium of autonoetic awareness,
to remember one’s own previous “thought-about” experiences (...)”.16 Therefore, auto-
noesis is necessary for MTT for it is the medium through which one can travel through
the subjective timeline that one is conscious of. Without autonoesis, there would be no
MTT and as a consequence, no episodic memory. And that is because a subject that is
not aware of his existence through time, is not able to project the self in this subjective
timeline and experience the perceptual contents that are stored in the episodic memory
system. Most continuist and discontinuist-based views, that accept that episodicmemory
is an experience of MTT, assume the necessity of autonoesis for MTT and consequently
for episodic memory.17
In this way, I defend that autonoesis is necessary for episodic memory, as viewed
as an experience of mental time travel. And that is because it is impossible by denition
for someone to have an episodicmemorywithout (1) having an awareness of his existence
through time (autonoesis), and (2) mentally traveling to a specic past episode (mental
time travel to the past). In Tulving’s words: “Autonoetic awareness (or autonoesis) is re-
quired for remembering. No autonoesis, no mental time travel”.18 For those reasons, as
far asmemory is concerned,MTT is only possible through episodicmemory. It is the only
type of memory that conveys the personal, sensorial, and emotional information that in-
volves the self ’s immersion in his own past experiences. This is important because if we
want to use concepts such as episodicmemory and autobiographicalmemory and be able
to distinguish between them, we must consider their dierences, and the necessity of a
subjective experience for episodic memory is one of them.
3 Dierence in Phenomenology
In this section, I intend to show through the reports of the case of the amnesic patient K.C.
that autobiographical memory is a type of memory that is experienced narratively and
that it diers from episodicmemory, which is presented perceptually. In this view, some-
one who autobiographically recalls can construct a life narrative that is ordered chrono-
logically, and that can be given verbally. This narrative also encompasses greater periods
of the person’s life, unlike episodicmemory, which contains only short episodes. The sec-
ond and main point is that autobiographical memory diers signicantly from episodic
memory since the latter comprises a subjectivity component, which the former does not,
and that the latter can be viewed as a form of MTT, as the former cannot.
16Tulving, E., “EpisodicMemory andAutonoesis: UniquelyHuman?" In TheMissing Link in Cognition (OxfordUniversity Press, 2005),
9.
17Robins, S., “Defending Discontinuism, Naturally,” Review of Philosophy and Psychology 11, no. 2 (2020), 471.
18Tulving, “Episodic Memory: FromMind to Brain.”, 2.
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3.1 The Case of Patient K.C.
Aer a motorcycle accident that led to a serious case of both anterograde and retrograde
amnesia, K.C. lost the ability to remember episodically or form new episodic memories.
With the progression of the study of his case, psychologists concluded that K.C.’s lesions to
the medial temporal lobe of his brain were the cause of his severe case of amnesia. How-
ever, those studies showed that although his episodicmemory capabilities were seriously
impaired, his capacity to recall semantically related information was maintained.19 In
other words, although K.C. could not remember either his distant ormore recent past, he
could know several facts about theworld and facts that occurred to him in his past.20 This
reinforced the idea that semantic and episodicmemories are processed in dierent areas
of the brain since the lesions to K.C.’s brain aected specically his episodic memory ca-
pabilities. K.C. lacks autonoesis, which in turn results in a lack of subjective awareness in
time, and consequently in an inability to access memories of the past and to think about
the future (MTT).21
But despite that, K.C. could knowgeneral facts about theworld andhis past,mean-
ing that he knew about facts that pertained to his life narrative. This preservation of
knowledge relating to his personal experiences is what is important to note here. K.C.
was not able to remember episodically, i.e. bring back to mind perceptual information
of past experiences, but he had factual information about his past and was able to con-
struct a verbally presented life narrative. K.C. knew “what year the family moved into
the house where they live now, the names of the schools he went to or where he spent his
summers in his teens”.22 But, although K.C. could know all that information, he could not
remember it, in the episodic sense. The dierence is that, although he could “remember”
which year they moved to the house where they now live and the names of the schools
in which he studied, he could not remember, for instance, the specic episode of the day
that they moved into the new house, or a specic episode that he experienced in one of
those schools. And that means that he could not relive and bring back to mind the joys
and sadnesses of past.
3.2 Defining Autobiographical Memory
The main point of confusion seems to be in the term remember. Aer all, when we refer
to K.C.’s capabilities of bringing past information tomind, we refer to it as remember, but
we should dierentiate between “remembering” in a semantic sense, which means that
the subject knows facts about the past, and remembering episodically, which means that
the subjectmentally travels back to the past and re-experiences perceptually that episode
once again. K.C. could not remember in the episodic sense, but he could remember in the
semantic sense. Tulvingmentions the dierence in vocabulary that we should note when
19Rosenbaum et al., “The Case of K.C.: Contributions of a Memory-Impaired Person to Memory Theory,” Neuropsychologia 43, no. 7
(2005), 994; Rosenbaum et al., “Amnesia as an Impairment of Detail Generation and Binding: Evidence from Personal, Fictional, and
Semantic Narratives in K.C.,” Neuropsychologia 47, no. 11 (2009), 2185; Tulving, “Memory and Consciousness.”, 4.
20Tulving, E., “Remembering and Knowing the Past,” American Scientist 77, no. 4 (1989), 362.
21Rosenbaum et al., “The Case of K.C.: Contributions of a Memory-Impaired Person to Memory Theory.”, 993.
22Tulving, “Memory and Consciousness.”, 4.
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we refer to the dierent actions that the individual engages when he employs this or that
type ofmemory.23 Stating that in the natural use of languagewe can dierentiate between
those actions even when using the same term, in academic use, and to avoid ambiguities
in the term“remembering”, we should refer tomemory in the episodic sense as “recollect-
ing” or “remembering” and in the semantic sense as “knowing” or “recalling”. Although
Tulving states that K.C. has autobiographical knowledge, meaning that he knows facts
that pertain to his past existence, he also says that we should distinguish it from “auto-
biographical memory” used here in the sense of episodic memory.24 Furthermore, he
mentions the relation of this kind of recalling to the self by saying that “It’s knowledge of
one’s life from the point of view of an observer rather than that of a participant.25 This
means that the subject does not participate in the recall in an experiential sense, but he
is “looking from the outside” (I shall treat the self-reference issue in section 4). While I
agree with Tulving’s armation that in recalling autobiographically the subject does not
experience the memory as an episode, with perceptual information, I do not agree that
we should not call that an autobiographicalmemory. That is because, if that were the case,
semantic memory, which is also constituted of propositional information, should not be
considered memory as well. So, it seems plausible to call autobiographical memory, the
propositional knowledge in which: (1) the subject has information of the personal past
that is presented verbally, and (2) that allows for the knowledge and construction of an
extended linear life narrative.
Additionally, concerning the types of consciousnesses implied in distinct kinds of
memory, it is a consensus amongpsychologists andphilosophers ofmemory that episodic
memory relates to autonoetic consciousness, and that semanticmemory relates to noetic
consciousness. But what about autobiographical memory? Just as semantic memory is
related to noetic consciousness, there is no reason to assume that autobiographicalmem-
orywould not be, since it is basedmostly on information of semantic nature, and it is pre-
sented propositionally. A noetic conscious being is aware of the knowledge he possesses
and can act upon objects, concepts, events, and their relationship, without their pres-
ence, employing symbolic knowledge.26 Furthermore, unlike noetic consciousness and
autonoetic consciousness, an anoetic conscious being canperceive the environment, rep-
resent its perception, and “behaviourly respond to aspects of the present environment.”.27
In this manner, anoetic consciousness is related to procedural memory, that is, themem-
ory for motor skills learned in the past that the individual can use in the present, like
remembering how to ride a bicycle. Autobiographical memories are not related to mo-
tor skills, neither are they related to re-experiencing the past and, therefore, the type of
consciousness they imply cannot be explained either by anoetic consciousness or auto-
noetic consciousness. Rather, given the similarity in content between autobiographical
memories and semantic memories, it seems reasonable to assume that, like semantic
memory, they are presented with noetic consciousness. K.C., for instance, is aware of the
knowledge that he possesses about himself and can present this knowledge verbally in
an extended temporalmanner. Thus, I believe that the awareness of his autobiographical
semantic knowledge can be suciently explained in terms of noetic consciousness.
23Tulving, “Remembering and Knowing the Past.”, 362-363.
24Tulving, “Remembering and Knowing the Past.”, 362-363.
25Tulving, “Remembering and Knowing the Past.”, 362-363
26Tulving, “Memory and Consciousness.”, 3.
27Tulving, “Memory and Consciousness.”, 3.
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K.C.’s vision of his past is presented as phenomenologically dry as his general
knowledge about the world, such as “2+2=4” or that “humans are mammals”, but it is
nonetheless a representation of his existence. It is not dicult to imagine that he could
have, for instance, drawing solely on semantic information, put together a narrative that
goes from his childhood to his adulthood, in chronological order. Those memories are
autobiographical because they present the happenings of his life, and he is conscious of
them. The dierence between remembrance of past episodes with an associated phe-
nomenal experience of reliving the past episode as past, and a semantical representation
of one’s past is what is worthwhile noting for present purposes.
One objection that might arise from this view concerns whether K.C. could orga-
nize his life narrative in chronological order without episodicmemory. Episodicmemory
is known as the type of memory that enables us to order events of our past. So, the agent
only knows that an event E1 came before an event E2 because he experienced those events
in this order. However, in cases of impaired episodic capacities, it is still possible for the
agent to order the semantic knowledge that pertains to a life narrative. This can happen
if (1) there is temporal-related information embedded in the content,28 (2) if the agent
learns the temporal order of the events,29 or (3) if he can interpret or infer the temporal
relations from the content given to consciousness.31 Thus, it would be possible for K.C to
order chronologically a life narrative based on information that carries explicit tempo-
ral information such as “I used to live in this house during my childhood”, or “I remem-
ber moving to this house in the year 1985”. These two examples give dierent degrees of
specicity of the temporal information that can enable an organization of the narrative
structure of autobiographical memories. Surely, in the case of neurotypical agents, the
process of organization would be much more uent, because they can use information
derived from episodic memories to do so, but that does not rule out the possibility that
K.C could have done it either, even if in a more elemental level. Also, just because neu-
rotypical agents may in some cases use episodic memories to help order chronologically
events in a life narrative, that does not mean that this episodic information is necessarily
a part of the life narrative.
Therefore, if we can say that K.C. has a narrative vision of his life because of his
propositional knowledge about his past and that this conscious narrative representation
is considered autobiographical memory, then we must agree that K.C. can recall autobi-
ographically, although completely incapable of remembering episodically. This contra-
dicts the common idea in the literature, that episodic memory is the same as autobio-
graphical memory.
Furthermore, assuming the phenomenological dierence between episodic and
autobiographical memories, and given the more temporal extended quality of the lat-
ter, it seems unrealistic to assume that the individual should have sensorial, iconic, and
complex information of all these life periods. Thus, the assumption that the ability of
MTT is present in most of the content of autobiographical memory, as it seems to be
suggested by the identication of episodic and autobiographical memories, can be seen
as cognitively unrealizable. Episodic memory is related to shorter and self-contained
28Tulving, E., “Episodic and Semantic Memory,” in Organization of Memory (Academic Press 1972), 389-390.
2930
31Klein, “Autonoesis and Belief in a Personal Past.”, 437-438.
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episodes that have emotional or sensorial relevance to the subject. We remember things
that are remembering-worthy, meaning that we remember things that have emotional
importance to us. So, if one asks if we think that we are living happy lives, even though
the question has an emotional character, our response would probably be based on auto-
biographical memories because the episodes of happiness and sadness are too many to
remember and account for.
My argument states that autobiographical memories can exist without episodic
information, in cases such as K.C’s. This could suggest two dierent views on the nature
of autobiographical remembering. First, it could be considered that semantic informa-
tion is more fundamental to the life narrative than episodic information. That is to say
that in neurotypical agents, there is some episodic information in the content of auto-
biographical memories, but in a considerably low amount when compared to semantic
information. As seen above, it is more plausible to defend that most of the content is of
propositional origin, as it would be unrealistic to assume that agents could remember all,
or even most of the perceptual information that would pertain to an entire life narrative.
Second, on a stricter view, it could be defended that all the content of the autobiographi-
cal memories is propositional, with no place for episodic information. That is to defend
that although in neurotypical agents narratives can contain some semantical information
that could elicit an episodicmemory, the life narrative itself is not presented perceptually,
it is, rather, presented propositionally. In the rst position, autobiographical memories
would have to be able to support both autonoetic and noetic consciousness. So, for this
reason, I defend that the second position is more suitable because it is a simpler account
of the type of consciousness of autobiographical memories. But independently of which
viewwe choose, it is still evident that a dierence between episodic and autobiographical
memories is necessary, insofar as K.C.’s case shows empirical evidence of an autonoetic
dierence between autobiographical memories and episodic memories.32
4 Memory’s Reference to the Self
This section aims to discuss whether we should consider K.C’s semantic knowledge of his
autobiography an autobiographical memory or whether it should be consideredmemory
at all.
The eld of investigations of the self and its relation tomemory is vast. Although I
do not intend here to give a complete account of the subject, it is worth explaining a basic
conceptual dierence that tries to shed light upon the distinctions between episodic and
autobiographical memory and its self-references, that will be useful for the discussion
of whether autobiographical memory should be considered a separate kind of memory.
To do so, I will borrow Baddeley’s distinction of the types of memory in which, on one
hand, the self is the experiencer (1), and on another, the self is the object of the experi-
32In the literature concerning the Simulation Theory of Memory, the preferable term for the episodic memory system might be
“episodic construction system”, that encompasses the whole of the imaginative processes that are able to construct mental scenarios
based on episodic information. For the purposes of this article, I preferred to treat it more generally, as “episodic memory system”,
but I think my view could be applicable to a simulational framework.
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ence (2).33 I consider, opposite to him, that episodic memories are more closely related
to type (1), and that autobiographical memories are more closely related to type (2). To
put it more clearly, it is as if when we are in a mnemic mental state, there are two selves:
The present self or the “experiencer self” and the past self or the “experienced self”. In
remembering, it is as if both selves are aligned or superpositioned, and consequently, the
subject has a full qualitative and personal experience of the episode. This is partly stated
by Perrin when he says: “Autonoeticity implies the identity of the self whose experience
is simulated with the simulating subject”.34 He also states the same in: “First, for the ap-
pearance of episodic memory to occur, I must have the belief that I am the subject whose
past experience I represent. This identity belief is a condition of the episodic appear-
ance”.35 Conversely, in recalling, the selves are kept separate, meaning that the present
self relates to the recall as an observer instead of an experiencer.
In autobiographical memory, as in a mnemic state that is based on semantic in-
formation, it does not seem to be the case that there is a superpositioning of both selves.
To defend that this is the case is to consequently arm that autobiographical memories
could share the same phenomenological experiences or would at least be capable of sub-
stantiating the same phenomenological complexity that episodic memory is capable of.
And that is because the only way in which the “experiencer self” can be identied with
the “experienced self” is in an autonoetic state. If my argument, in which autobiograph-
ical memories are related to semantic information, and its content presented by noetic
consciousness is right, then the alignment of both selves would not be reasonable, be-
cause they would dene autonoetic awareness, which as I tried to show, is non-present in
autobiographical memories.
One objection that can emerge frommy ideas iswhetherwe should consider a nar-
rative view of our lives as a type ofmemory. This point has already beenmade by Klein.36
He argues that only those kinds of memories that we would describe as episodic (mental
states with a past-oriented subjectivity), can be conceived as memories. This means that
the autobiographical knowledge that K.C. has which enables him to have information not
only about the past but the past that relates to his life, cannot be considered a memory of
any kind. While Iwould agreewithKlein by saying that he cannot remember episodically,
because he lacks the ability to mentally travel to the past or to even conceive himself in a
subjective timeline, I think it is too extreme to not consider it memory. And that ismainly
because the problem of the dierentiation of those entities can be solved, as Tulving did,
by referring to it by dierent actions. For this reason, I argue thatmy view shows a degree
towhichwe can still call the knowledge that K.C. has of his past “memory”, by referring to
it as autobiographical memory, as it possesses two of the main consensual general char-
acteristics, that seem to be important for the recognition of a mental state as a memory,
which are: (1) a present reference to the past,meaning that the present information refers
to something that alreadyhappened, and (2) a reference to a self,meaning that the subject
knows (or feels) that the information brought to mind refers to his experience.37
33Baddeley, A., “What Is Autobiographical Memory?,” in Theoretical Perspectives on Autobiographical Memory (Dordrecht: Springer
Netherlands, 1992), 19.
34Denis Perrin, “Asymmetries in Subjective Time,” In Seeing the Future: Theoretical Perspectives on Future-oriented Mental Time Travel
(Oxford University Press, 2016), 46.
35Denis Perrin, 52.
36Klein, S.B., “What Memory Is,”Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Cognitive Science 6, no. 1 (2015), 1.
37Criteria (i) and (ii) seem to be consensual throughout most of the philosophical tradition on memory. I think that the dier-
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At this point, with the empirical evidence shown, to say that autobiographical
memories are the same as episodic memory, is, at least, debatable. Taking Klein’s ap-
proach and saying that autobiographical memory is not memory at all is a possibility,
but one that is very costly because it would mean that semantic memory, which similarly
to autobiographical memory draws its contents from propositional information, would
not be memory also. Although Klein’s view is plausible, I believe that a more intermedi-
ate view in which both episodic memory and semantic memory are types of memory, or
even a broad view, which holds that episodic, semantic, and even procedural memories
are indeed forms of memory,38 is more adequate.
Also, to call an autobiographical memory a semantic memory, because of its re-
latedness with propositional information, seems at least questionable. Indeed, although
both semantic and autobiographical memories pertain to the self, meaning that both are
of things that the self knows, autobiographical memory goes further and is also knowl-
edge about things that happened to the self. And for that reason, I argue that they are
dierent. In autobiographical memory, the present self is an observer of the facts that
happened to the past self, without their identication, which would equate to episodic
memory. In semantic memory, however, the present self is an observer of general facts
about the world that he knows, but not about his past self. I believe that to dierentiate
clearly between semantic, autobiographical, and episodic memories may help us under-
stand the capability of the brain to maintain a verbally available life narrative, even in
cases where autonoetic awareness is missing.
5 Conclusion
Considering what has been demonstrated I conclude that even though they are some-
times still treated as a synonymous term throughout philosophical and psychological dis-
cussions, there are good reasons to believe that episodic and autobiographical memory
should be considered fundamentally dierent. Considering that the kind of recall that
K.C. has is of autobiographical relevance and that it diers in phenomenology, meaning
that it lacks the autonoetic component and it is not presented as an experience of MTT to
the past, as episodic memory is, then there should be no reason to identify the two. Fur-
thermore, I argued that autobiographical recalling should be considered a separate kind
of memory, than for instance, semantic memory, because its content relates to the self in
a more meaningful way than the content of semantic memory, as can be demonstrated
by insights about the relation of memory and the self.39 Concerning the content, I show
that the information of autobiographical memories, while similar to semantic informa-
tion since it relates to facts, consists nonetheless, in facts about agent’s life happenings
entiation between episodic and autobiographical memories can be defended both in a causal framework as well as a simulational
framework. The only requirement seems to be that the theory supports a view in which episodic memories are presented as an expe-
rience of MTT. However because themain theories of memory deal with the dierence betweenmemory and imagination, and here I
am proposing a dierentiation between two types of memory, I le other more specic criteria out. Tomore information on dierent
theories of memory, see Michaelian and Robins, “Beyond the Causal Theory? Fiy Years aer Martin and Deutscher,” New Directions
in the Philosophy of Memory (Routledge, 2018), 13–32.
38Michaelian, “Opening the Doors of Memory: Is Declarative Memory a Natural Kind?,” Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Cognitive
Science 6, no. 6 (2015), 476.
39Baddeley, “What Is Autobiographical Memory?”; Perrin, “Asymmetries in Subjective Time.”
Aporia Vol. 21 77
that are, however, not presented perceptually as is episodic memory.
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